



The French Energy Regulatory Commission (CRE) is consulting market participants.

## **PUBLIC CONSULTATION N° 2020-003 OF 13 FEBRUARY 2020 ON THE CHANGE IN THE METHOD FOR MARKETING ENTRY CAPACITY AT THE PIR DUNKERQUE AND PIR OLTINGUE**

To enable shippers to transport gas to the French marketplace, GRTgaz sells capacity in the upstream transmission network, at network interconnection points (PIRs), at storage/transmission interconnection points (PITS), and at LNG terminal/transmission interconnection points (PITTM).

Article L.134-2, 4° of the French energy code empowers CRE to specify the conditions for using the natural gas transmission networks.

(EU) regulation 2017/459 of the Commission of 16 March 2017, concerning the establishment of a network code on capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission systems (hereinafter “CAM code”<sup>1</sup>), applies to all PIRs connecting the French transmission network to the transmission network of another Member State and sets a framework for the rules for marketing this capacity at national networks’ entries and exits. In France, it applies to all points except those of Dunkerque (Norway) and Oltingue (Switzerland).

In order to gradually move towards the marketing mode defined by the CAM code, and to meet the request of several clients, CRE changed the capacity marketing rules at the PIR Dunkerque in its deliberations of 27 July 2017<sup>2</sup> and 8 March 2018<sup>3</sup>. GRTgaz now proposes to finalise this process by adopting, for the PIR Dunkerque, modalities for capacity allocation in line with those specified by the CAM code.

The investments necessary for the creation of new entry capacity in the French network at the PIR Oltingue (Switzerland to France direction) were approved by CRE in the deliberation of 17 December 2014<sup>4</sup>, validating the creation of 100 GWh/d of quasi-firm entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue, without any investments to strengthen the network core. These entry capacities, which entered service as from 1 June 2018, are sold following specific rules defined by the deliberation of 27 July 2017<sup>2</sup>. GRTgaz proposes to change these specific rules for entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue, to bring them closer to those of the CAM code.

To simplify access to the network for shippers, GRTgaz sent CRE two proposals for changing the entry capacity marketing modalities at the PIR Dunkerque and Oltingue respectively.

The present consultation aims to collect market participants’ views on these changes, about which CRE intends to deliberate in the first quarter of 2020.

<sup>1</sup> [Regulation \(EU\) No 2017/459 of the Commission of 16 March 2017 establishing a network code on capacity allocation mechanisms in gas transmission systems and repealing regulation \(EU\) No 984/2013](#)

<sup>2</sup> [CRE’s deliberation of 27 July 2017 deciding on the change in the marketing mode for capacity at the PIR Dunkerque, the change in the marketing modes for interruptible capacity, and on the creation of entry capacity at Oltingue](#)

<sup>3</sup> [CRE’s deliberation of 8 March 2018 deciding on the change in the marketing mode for capacity at the PIR Dunkerque](#)

<sup>4</sup> [CRE’s deliberation of 17 December 2014 examining GRTgaz’s ten-year development plan and approving its investment programme for 2015](#)

**To participate in the consultation**

CRE invites all interested parties to submit their contributions, by 13 March 2020 at the latest, by entering their contribution on the new platform set up by CRE : <https://consultations.cre.fr>.

For the purpose of transparency, contributions will be published by CRE.

**If your contribution contains elements that you wish to keep confidential, a version concealing those elements should also be provided.** In that case, only that version will be published. CRE reserves the right to publish elements that could be essential for all participants, provided that they are not secrets protected by law.

**In the absence of a redacted version, the full version will be published,** except for information falling under secrets protected by law.

Interested parties are invited to provide well-grounded answers to the questions.

Paris, 13 February 2020

For the Energy Regulatory Commission,

The Chairman,

Jean-François CARENCO

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## 1. CHANGE IN MARKETING RULES AT THE PIR DUNKERQUE

The PIR Dunkerque, as the Franpipe entry point, directly connecting France to Norwegian production fields, does not connect the French transmission network to the transmission network of another European Union Member State. Therefore, it does not fall within the scope of application of the CAM code. The entry capacities at this point are allocated based on specific marketing rules. In order to gradually move towards the marketing mode defined by the CAM code, and to meet the request of several clients, CRE changed the capacity marketing rules at the PIR Dunkerque in its deliberations of 27 July 2017<sup>5</sup> and 8 March 2018<sup>6</sup>.

### 1.1. Current marketing mode

#### 1.1.1. Types of capacities marketed

GRTgaz currently sells three types of entry capacities at the PIR Dunkerque:

- **firm capacities**, the use of which is guaranteed by GRTgaz under normal operating conditions;
- **releasable capacities**: if shippers' requests exceed the capacity available for sale at the PIR Dunkerque, all shippers holding more than 20% of firm annual capacity available at the PIR Dunkerque return to the market a fraction R of the portion of capacity it holds beyond this 20% (where R = 20%). The releasable capacity is sold to shippers that do not have any capacity at the PIR;
- **interruptible capacity**, the availability of which mainly depends on the use and configuration of the network.

GRTgaz proposes capacities at the following timeframes:

- yearly, quarterly, monthly and daily for firm and interruptible capacity;
- yearly for releasable capacity.

#### 1.1.2. Capacity timeframes and marketing timetable

The timeframes of capacities sold and the marketing timetable currently in effect at the PIR Dunkerque were defined by CRE's deliberations of 27 July 2017 and 8 March 2018.

##### 1.1.2.1. Yearly capacities

The yearly capacities of a year Y are activated as from 1 October Y to 30 September Y+1.

Each year Y, from 11 to 20 June, 15 annual capacity years independent of each other are sold through an open subscription period (OSP)<sup>7</sup>. The volume of capacity sold corresponds to 100% of available capacity for year Y+1, 90% for years Y+2 to Y+5, and 80% for years Y+6 to Y+15.

For each year, firm and then releasable capacity is allocated to shippers. When demand is greater than supply, capacity is allocated, for each year, in proportion to the requests made by shippers.

When all firm and releasable capacity is allocated, GRTgaz sells interruptible capacity, from 21 to 30 June.

##### 1.1.2.2. Quarterly capacity

Quarterly capacity is also sold by GRTgaz through an OSP mechanism.

Between 11 and 20 July of a year Y, all quarters of the upcoming gas year (from 1 October Y to 30 September Y+1) are sold. Capacities available the last three quarters are again sold between 11 and 20 October of year Y. Then capacity available the last two quarters are again sold from 11 to 20 January Y+1. Lastly, capacities available the last quarter are sold for the last time from 11 to 20 April of year Y+1.

Since releasable capacity is only sold in the form of yearly products, a request for quarterly capacity cannot be fulfilled by a capacity release from another shipper.

<sup>5</sup> CRE's deliberation of 27 July 2017 deciding on the change in the marketing mode for capacity at the PIR Dunkerque, the change in the marketing modes for interruptible capacity, and on the creation of entry capacity at Oltingue

<sup>6</sup> CRE's deliberation of 8 March 2018 deciding on the change in the marketing mode for capacity at the PIR Dunkerque

<sup>7</sup> Open subscription period: subscription demands made during the booking window are deemed to have been logged simultaneously. The capacities are allocated based on these demands, with the application of a pro rata if the accumulated demand exceeds the capacity available.

### 1.1.2.3. Monthly and daily capacity, and UBI

Monthly capacity for a month M is sold through an OSP from 1 to 10 of month M-1. At the end of the sale, the remaining available capacity can be booked within the framework of a booking window open from day 11 of month M-1 to the third working day preceding the first day of month M, based on the first-come-first-served (FCFS) rule.

Daily capacity for a gas day D of month M is sold based on the FCFS rule from the second working day preceding the first day of month M to D-1, 1:00 p.m.

Lastly, intraday capacity is accessible through the use-it-or-buy-it (UBI) mechanism, and enables shippers to nominate capacity above their existing subscriptions. The capacity so made available corresponds to capacity booked but not used at each cycle by shippers, as well as capacity not sold by GRTgaz. These capacities are interruptible and sold at 1/240<sup>th</sup> of the price of firm yearly capacity.

All of the current selling terms are summarised in the table in Annex 1.

### 1.1.3. Marketing platform

The PRISMA platform<sup>8</sup>, a joint capacity booking platform for European transmission system operators, is used for the trading of firm and interruptible capacity, but does not have a selling slot for releasable capacity. Selling of these capacities on the PRISMA platform would require the development of a specific computer procedure, deemed too complex and too costly by GRTgaz (about €500 k).

Therefore, the PIR Dunkerque is the only PIR in GRTgaz's network for which capacities are sold on the operator's internal platform, TRANS@ctions<sup>9</sup>.

## 1.2. GRTgaz's proposal

At the meeting of the Concertation gaz "Capacity Allocation" working group of 17 June 2019, GRTgaz proposed pursuing the change in the rules for capacity marketing at the PIR Dunkerque in order to finalise their alignment with those of the CAM code, by eliminating releasable capacity and adopting similar rules and timetable as those specified by the CAM code. Participants did not express any objections to the changes proposed.

GRTgaz considers that with several active participants holding long-term subscriptions at the PIR Dunkerque, the process of opening up this entry point to competition through the existence of releasable capacity is now completed, particularly against the imminent expiration of a large portion of long-term subscriptions at this point. In addition, the operator highlights that with the elimination of releasable capacity, capacity at the PIR Dunkerque can be sold on the European PRISMA platform. Moreover, the other interconnection points connecting the Norwegian network (Dornum and Emden in Germany, Zeebrugge in Belgium) to the rest of Europe are already sold on this platform based on the provisions of the CAM code.

The changes proposed by GRTgaz are as follows:

- elimination of releasable capacity;
- selling of capacity at the PIR Dunkerque on the PRISMA platform;
- for yearly capacity, end of the June OSP, specific to the PIR Dunkerque. Selling once a year during PRISMA July auctions (first Monday in July), of 90% of capacity available for year Y+1 to Y+5 and 80% for year Y+6 to Y+15;
- selling of quarterly capacity based on a timetable and terms aligned with those specified by the CAM code:
  - all quarters of the upcoming gas year (from October Y to September Y+1) would be sold at the PRISMA August auctions (the first Monday of the month of August);
  - the last three quarters would again be sold at PRISMA auctions of November of year Y (first Monday of November);
  - the last two quarters would again be sold at PRISMA auctions of February of year Y+1 (first Monday of February);
  - the last quarter would again be sold at PRISMA auctions of May of year Y+1 (first Monday of May);
- selling of monthly capacity through the PRISMA auctions of month M-1 (third Monday of month M-1). End of the "first-come-first-served" and "use-it-or-buy-it" mechanisms;
- selling of daily capacities at day-ahead auctions (4.30 p.m. D-1);

<sup>8</sup> <https://platform.prisma-capacity.eu/#/start>

<sup>9</sup> <https://transactions.grtgaz.com/portail/login>

- selling of intraday capacities at auctions from 7.00 p.m. to 2.30 a.m. D-1, then every hour. The UBI offer for daily interruptible capacities would be maintained, but would only be open as from when all firm capacity has been sold, following terms aligned with those specified by the CAM code.

All of the new selling terms envisaged are summarised in the table in Annex 2.

Furthermore, based on the current subscriptions at the PIR Dunkerque, only 60 GWh/d of the 570 GWh/d of firm technical capacity will be available for yearly capacity subscriptions from October 2020 to September 2021. GRTgaz proposes to adopt a transitional regime for the first year (sale of July 2020), and to sell all firm capacity available for Y+1 (i.e. 60 GWh/d).

Afterwards, i.e. as from the July 2021 sale, rules similar to those specified by the CAM code indicated above would apply without exception for yearly capacity.

### 1.3. CRE's analysis

CRE considers that the selling of capacity at the PIR Dunkerque based on rules similar to those specified by the CAM code and through the PRISMA platform would be beneficial for the French market.

CRE considers that the end of the exceptional provision for the PIR Dunkerque, and therefore the selling of this PIR on the same platform and following the same timetable and terms as the PIRs subject to the CAM code, would improve the clarity of the entry capacity offering in the French single zone. In addition, as indicated by GRTgaz, capacities at other European PIRs connected to the Norwegian Gassco network are already sold on the PRISMA platform, based on the rules of the CAM code.

The capacity release mechanism had been created to enable the gradual opening of the PIR Dunkerque to competition. Initially, the capacities of this entry point in the French network were in fact held exclusively by the incumbent supplier. Today, although certain participants still have a volume exceeding 20% of total technical capacity, a significant number of participants have long-term subscriptions at this point, and use it to bring gas in France. CRE therefore considers that this mechanism created in 2006 has proven to be effective and has fulfilled its objective. In that regard, CRE notes that the last capacity release at the PIR Dunkerque dates back to February 2017, with all annual capacity demands having since been satisfied without using the releasable capacity held by shippers. In addition, as highlighted by GRTgaz, the upcoming years will be marked by the end of long-term subscriptions at this PIR (see Annex 3). GRTgaz anticipates that shippers will further optimise their subscriptions by more frequently using short-term capacities. This change in subscription strategy is already visible at the PIR Dunkerque, with a higher number of active participants than before in the short-term market segment. In this context, the new rules proposed, with the obligation to book a minimum of 10% of total technical capacity for short-term subscriptions, could prove to be more suitable for guaranteeing competition at the PIR. CRE therefore considers that given the current situation at the PIR Dunkerque and its future prospects, maintaining the releasable capacity mechanisms no longer appears necessary.

From a tariff point of view, CRE reiterates that releasable capacity is paid for by shippers at a price of 90% of the charge for firm capacity. The elimination of releasable capacity would therefore imply that the portion formerly considered releasable would be priced at 100% of the charge for firm capacity (i.e. as at 1 April 2020, €104.97/MWh/d/year). Moreover, their holder would now be guaranteed to have all of these capacities at their disposal (whereas GRTgaz could demand a full or partial release with the current system).

Lastly, CRE questions the relevance of a transitional regime for the July 2020 auctions, as proposed by GRTgaz. CRE deems it necessary, in a context in which, according to GRTgaz, participants will increasingly book short-term capacities, to maintain short-term capacity. Therefore, CRE is not in favour of the transitional phase proposed by GRTgaz for this booking window, which involves selling the entire 60 GWh/d available as yearly capacity. At this stage, CRE favours an application of the new terms as of the July 2020 auctions: 3 GWh/d of firm yearly capacity would be sold for the October 2020 – September 2021 period and 57 GWh/d would be booked for future short-term subscriptions.

**Question 1** Are you in favour of the elimination of releasable capacities at the PIR Dunkerque and the implementation of new terms for selling capacity as proposed by GRTgaz?

**Question 2** Do you share CRE's analysis, against the introduction of a transitional regime for the July 2020 auctions enabling GRTgaz to sell all capacity available as yearly capacity for marketing year 1?

## 2. CHANGE IN THE MARKETING RULES FOR ENTRY CAPACITY AT THE PIR OLTINGUE

The Oltingue entry point (Switzerland to France direction) entered service in June 2018, proposing the sale of 100 GWh/d of "quasi-firm" capacities and 100 GWh/d of interruptible capacity. Prior to this, during an open season held in 2012, market participants' subscription commitments did not suffice to cover the costs of investing in the network core. GRTgaz's investment enabling the creation of entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue was therefore not accompanied by an equivalent development of the network core (100 GWh/d), which would have guaranteed accommodation of capacity without congestion, regardless of the flow configuration. The current marketing mode for entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue, specified by CRE's deliberation of 27 July 2017, takes this particularity into account.

### 2.1. Current marketing mode

Since entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue relies on the pre-existing network core infrastructure, designed for the entry capacity at the PIR Virtualys and Obergailbach, the current marketing mode has a dual goal of limiting the total amount of firm entry capacity sold at the Virtualys, Obergailbach and Oltingue points combined to the firm capacity that the French internal system can handle, and to give priority to the two historic entry points.

The following table summarises the firm capacity available at the different points affected by the selling of capacity at the PIR Oltingue entry:

GWh/d	Taisnières H	Obergailbach	Oltingue	Network core capacity common to the three points
Firm capacity	640	620	100	1,260

From an operational point of view, this specific marketing mode results in the following conditions:

- the sum of firm capacity sold at Virtualys, Obergailbach and Oltingue cannot exceed 1,260 GWh/d;
- on the PRISMA platform, Oltingue entry capacities are sold after those of Virtualys and Obergailbach for the same timeframe, with the exception of the intraday timeframe. To accommodate this, firm capacity at Oltingue is sold based on the timetable for interruptible capacity at other points, and interruptible capacity is sold in the next timeslot.

The table below summarises the current timetable for selling capacity for the Oltingue entry:

Product	Selling dates for firm entry capacity at Oltingue	Selling dates for interruptible entry capacity at Oltingue
Yearly (following year)	1 <sup>st</sup> slot for selling yearly interruptible capacity on PRISMA	-
Quarterly	1 <sup>st</sup> slot for selling quarterly interruptible capacity on PRISMA	2 <sup>nd</sup> slot for selling quarterly interruptible capacity on PRISMA
Monthly	1 <sup>st</sup> slot for selling monthly interruptible capacity on PRISMA	2 <sup>nd</sup> slot for selling monthly interruptible capacity on PRISMA
Daily	1 <sup>st</sup> slot for selling daily interruptible capacity on PRISMA	-
Intraday	PRISMA time slots for selling intraday capacity	-



For each entry capacity auction at Oltingue, subsequent to auctions conducted for capacity at the Virtualys and Obergailbach points, the volume of firm capacity sold is therefore defined based on the firm capacity already booked at those other two points, and limited to 100 GWh/d. In addition, 10% of firm technical capacity is reserved for short-term sales, at each point and at the sum of the three points Virtualys + Obergailbach + Oltingue. The example with figures in Annex 4 describes this specific operating mode.

Lastly, for the yearly timeframe, only the capacities for the following year are sold at the July auctions (compared to 15 years at the PIR Virtualys and Obergailbach which follow the rules of the CAM code) in order to avoid any risk of contractual congestion.

## 2.2. GRTgaz's proposal

GRTgaz proposes to change the specific marketing mode currently in effect for the PIR Oltingue entry, in order to move it closer to the rules of the CAM code.

GRTgaz indeed considers that the current offer is not very clear for shippers: on the one hand, the entry capacity available at the PIR Oltingue depends on the capacity sold at the PIR Virtualys and PIR Obergailbach during the previous auction, and on the other hand, firm capacity is sold during the slot for interruptible capacity. In addition, with the current marketing mode, the calculation of available entry capacity is done by the operator, before implementing the volume proposed for sale on the PRISMA platform. GRTgaz highlights the IT complexity of this calculation for the PIR Oltingue, and wishes to move towards a simpler and more accurate procedure, particularly within the context of an upgrade in its sales information system.

From an operational point of view, the changes proposed by GRTgaz are as follows:

- end of the selling of firm entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue during time slots devoted to interruptible capacity. It would be sold based on the standard CAM timetable;
- for yearly, quarterly and monthly timeframes, end of the calculation of entry capacity actually available for sale at Oltingue based on the entry capacity previously booked at the PIR Virtualys and PIR Obergailbach: the entry capacity at these three points would be sold simultaneously on PRISMA according to the “competing auction” principle (see below);
- for daily and intraday timeframes, selling of entry capacity at Oltingue based on rules similar to those of the CAM code, without competing auction conditions;
- during annual capacity auctions in July, selling of the upcoming 15 years, for 90% of capacity available for the years Y+1 to Y+5 and 80% for the years Y+6 to Y+15.

The competing auction principle proposed by GRTgaz for yearly, quarterly and monthly capacity is an option available on the PRISMA platform imposing a limit on the volume of capacity sold simultaneously at a set of several PIRs. For these timeframes, GRTgaz proposes to add a general condition “capacity sold at the Obergailbach + Virtualys + Oltingue entry points combined < 1,260 GWh/d” to the three specific conditions “Obergailbach < 620 GWh/d”, “Virtualys < 640 GWh/d”, and “Oltingue < 100 GWh/d” already in effect for these points. At the end of the auction phase, if the sum of shippers’ demand at these three points does not exceed the predefined limit of 1,260 GWh/d, the capacity will be allocated. If the sum of the demands at these three points exceeds the limit of 1,260 GWh/d, no capacity will be allocated and a new auction phase will be opened increasing the price by one price step. The example available in Annex 5 describes this marketing mode.

For daily and intraday capacity, GRTgaz considers that, given the record of capacity booked at the Virtualys, Obergailbach and Oltingue points, and the expected change in their long-term subscriptions, there is very little risk of exceeding 1,260 GWh/d of capacity sold. The operator therefore proposes not to implement the competing auction mechanism for these timeframes, and to sell them as firm capacity along with capacity of the same timeframes at the PIR Obergailbach and PIR Virtualys.

GRTgaz proposes to apply these changes as from 1 July 2020.



### **2.3. CRE's analysis**

CRE is in favour of the process to simplify and harmonise the operating rules of all entry points in the French market. CRE notes that the change proposed by GRTgaz would indeed simplify the process for managing the selling of capacity, by aligning it with the standard CAM timetable, and internalising in the PRISMA platform the computer calculations concerning the level of capacity available for sale.

However, GRTgaz's proposal puts firm entry capacity at Obergailbach and at Virtualys in direct competition with quasi-firm entry capacity at Oltingue. CRE reiterates that the current process for selling capacity at Oltingue aims to take into account this difference: indeed, firm capacity was developed taking into account the transmission network reinforcements made necessary by the creation of this capacity. In the case of quasi-firm entry capacities at the PIR Oltingue however, the investment enabling their creation was not accompanied by an equivalent development of the network core. This decision was taken after consultation of market participants who had indicated that they were not in favour of these investments. Within the framework of capacity sales auctions, direct competition between firm and quasi-firm capacities could reduce shippers' ability to access firm capacity, the selling of which would no longer be prioritised. CRE is not in favour of this direct competition between two products of varying degrees of firmness.

In addition, with regard to GRTgaz's proposal to not apply the competing auction condition for daily capacity, CRE deems it essential for firm capacity sold by operators to take into account the existing transmission network limits in order to ensure the proper functioning of the network. In the case of cold peaks or technical failures, the possible sale of 100 GWh/d of firm entry capacity at Oltingue in the standard CAM time slot and without a competing auction condition with the PIR Virtualys and the PIR Obergailbach, as proposed by GRTgaz, could contribute to the emergence of congestion in the network core and ultimately lead to costs for managing this congestion (locational spread). Therefore, CRE considers that selling firm entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue without a competition auction condition is not acceptable.

Consequently, at this stage CRE is not in favour of GRTgaz's proposal to change the selling of entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue.

**Question 3** Do you share CRE's analysis, against the change in the marketing mode for entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue, according to the terms proposed by GRTgaz?

### **3. SUMMARY OF QUESTIONS**

**Question 1** Are you in favour of the elimination of releasable capacities at the PIR Dunkerque and the implementation of new terms for selling capacity as proposed by GRTgaz?

**Question 2** Do you share CRE's analysis, against the introduction of a transitional regime for the July 2020 auctions enabling GRTgaz to sell all capacity available as yearly capacity for marketing year 1?

**Question 3** Do you share CRE's analysis, against the change in the marketing mode for entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue, according to the terms proposed by GRTgaz?

# ANNEX


## Annex 1 – Table summarising the current marketing mode for capacity at the PIR Dunkerque

Produit	Période de validité	Ferme		Interruptible	
		OSP	FCFS	OSP	UBI
ANNUEL	1/10/A - 1/10/A+1	du 11 au 20 juin		du 21 au dernier jour de juin	
	...				
TRIMESTRIEL	1/10/A+14 - 1/10/A+15	du 11 au 20 juillet		du 21 au dernier jour de juillet	
	Q1: 1/10/A - 1/01/A+1				
	Q2: 1/01/A+1 - 1/04/A+1				
	Q3: 1/04/A+1 - 1/07/A+1				
MENSUEL	Q4: 1/07/A+1 - 1/10/A+1	du 11 au 20 octobre	du 11 du mois M-1 jusqu'à 3 jours ouvrés avant le 1er jour du mois M	du 21 au dernier jour d'octobre	du 11 du mois M-1 jusqu'à 3 jours ouvrés avant le 1er jour du mois M
		du 11 au 20 janvier		du 21 au dernier jour de janvier	
QUOTIDIEN	Mois M	du 1 au 10 du mois M-1	à partir 2 <sup>ème</sup> jour ouvré précédent le 1 <sup>er</sup> jour du mois M jusqu'à 13h en J-1	du 21 au dernier jour d'avril	nominations de 14h en J-1 à 3h en J
INTRA QUOTIDIEN	Jour J			du 1 au 10 du mois M-1	
	H+4 pour le jour jusqu'à la fin de la journée gazière				

## Annex 2 – Table summarising the new marketing mode proposed by GRTgaz at the PIR Dunkerque

Produit	Période de validité	Ferme		Interruptible / Rebours (**)	
		Publication	Date de démarrage	Publication	Date de démarrage
ANNUEL	1/10/A - 1/10/A+1	1 mois avant le début de l'enchère	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de juillet A	1 semaine avant le début de l'enchère	3 <sup>ème</sup> lundi de juillet A
	...				
TRIMESTRIEL	1/10/A+14 - 1/10/A+15	2 semaines avant le début de l'enchère	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi d'août	1 semaine avant le début de l'enchère	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de septembre
	Q1: 1/10/A - 1/01/A+1				
	Q2: 1/01/A+1 - 1/04/A+1				
	Q3: 1/04/A+1 - 1/07/A+1				
MENSUEL	Q4: 1/07/A+1 - 1/10/A+1	1 semaine avant le début de l'enchère	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de novembre	1 semaine avant le début de l'enchère	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de décembre
		3 <sup>ème</sup> lundi du mois M-1	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de février	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de mars	
QUOTIDIEN	Mois M		1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de mai	1 <sup>er</sup> lundi de juin	
INTRA QUOTIDIEN	Jour J				
	H+4 pour le jour jusqu'à la fin de la journée gazière				
		16h30 J-1		17h30 J-1	
		A partir de 19h jusqu'à 2h30 puis chaque heure		UBI	

**Annex 3 – Capacity currently booked at the PIR Dunkerque**



**Annex 4 – Concrete example of the marketing mode currently in effect for entry capacity at the PIR Oltingue**

Example:

For a yearly capacity auction, 10% of capacity must be set aside for the short term.

Assuming that for the year of sale concerned, entry subscriptions already booked are at 30 GWh/d at Oltingue, 570 GWh/d at Taisnières H and 500 GWh/d at Obergailbach.

Firm capacity available at Oltingue is  $(90\% \times 100) - 30 = 60$  GWh/d.

Network core firm capacity available is  $(90\% \times 1,260) = 1,134$  GWh/d.


Firm capacity booked at the PIR Oltingue, PIR Taisnières H, and PIR Obergailbach is  $30 + 570 + 500 = 1,100$  GWh/d.

Firm capacity that can be proposed at Oltingue is therefore  $C = \min(60; 1,134 - 1,100) = 34$  GWh/d.

**Annex 5 – Concrete example of the operating mode of competing auctions under PRISMA**


Example for the sum “Virtualys + Obergailbach + Oltingue” capped at 250 GWh/d, with Virtualys < 100 GWh/d, Obergailbach < 150 GWh/d and Oltingue < 100 GWh/d.

1<sup>st</sup> case: demand < supply:



The condition is met for all inter-points, the capacity demanded by shippers at each PIR is therefore allocated.

2<sup>nd</sup> case: demand > supply:



Initially, the capacity demanded by shippers for the three PIRs combined, at 270 GWh/d, exceeds the limit set at 250 GWh/d. Therefore, no capacity is allocated and a new auction phase is opened increasing the price by one price step (ascending auctions). When demand becomes lower than 250 GWh/d (auction round no. n), capacity is allocated to shippers.

### Annex 6 – Record of capacity booked at the PIR Virtualys and the PIR Obergailbach

Historique des capacités souscrites à Virtualys, Obergailbach (entrées; GWh/j)

